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Does international law affect state behavior?. 
Why would states pay any attention to 
international law in the absence of coercive 
enforcement mechanism?. What do we mean 
when we say international law is “binding”, 
given that states can almost always to violate 
it?. These intriguing and philosophical questions 
raised by the author to make sure that we had 
grasped at least one answer. If not, we were 
failed to understand the nature of international 
law. These question also remains us about 
traditional debate between proponent and 
opponent of international law such as Hobbes, 
Spinoza and Austin. But, in the 21st Century we 
are not debating or neglecting the existence of 
international law anymore.
Written by Andrew T. Guzman who is 
recently serving as dean of The University 
of Southern California Gould School of Law 
(USC Gould), this book develops a persuasive 
explanation of why and when international 
law works by using rational choice perspective. 
Although previously there are some authors 
focusing their study on this topic such as 
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Professor Abraham Chayes and Antonia 
Handler Chayes in their book “The New 
Sovereignty: Compliance with International 
Regulatory Agreement” which uses managerial 
approach in describing the compliance of 
international law and Professor Thomas Franck 
in his book “Fairness in International Law 
and Institution” which explains why states 
comply with international law by introducing 
fairness approach, this book offers better 
perspective in understanding international law 
in contemporary development by proposing 
“Rational Choice Theory”. The theory then 
is developed into “Three	 Rs	 of	 Compliance”	
(Reputation, Reciprocity and Retaliation). The 
book tries to explain how international law is 
able to affect state behavior despite a lack of 
coercive enforcement mechanism. 
This book consists of six chapters. In the 
first	 chapter as introduction, the author gives 
brief overview on how international law can 
change state behaviors by analyzing some 
case studies. The cases are divided both when 
states complied with international law (by or 
international court decision treaty mechanism) 
and when states disobeyed international law (by 
withdrawal from a treaty regime). The former 
cases can be seen in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism where states prefer resolving their 
trade disputes on Dispute Settlement Body, The 
existence of International Court of Justice as 
judicial body, Regional Court such as European 
Court Human Rights (ECHR), Biological Weapon 
Convention, Free Trade Agreement among 
United State, Canada and Mexico (NAFTA) 
and Helsinki Final Act (Soft Law) respectively 
promote cooperation and compliance of 
international law. The latter is depicted in “Jose	
Ernesto	Medellin	Case. This case related to the 
rights of foreigner under Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relation (VCCR) to be informed upon 
their arrest to their consular official. Because 
United States had denied Medellin rights, 
Mexico government sued United States to 
International Court of Justice then ICJ ruled that 
United States had violated its obligation under 
VCCR and ordered to review its domestic legal 
proceedings. Instead of implemented ICJ Ruling, 
there was a different point of view (conflict) 
between President Bush and United States’ 
Supreme Court in responding ICJ decision. In 
the one hand, Supreme Court prefer neglecting 
ICJ decision by referring to previous case on 
Sanchez Llamas Case ruled that ICJ decisions 
are just entitled as “Respectful	Consideration”	
(not binding on U.S Court) and in the other 
hands, President Bush was ordering the states 
to followed instruction of ICJ. Unfortunately, in 
2005 United States announced its withdrawal 
to VCCR’s Optional Protocol, depriving the ICJ 
jurisdiction over future disputes. Based on both 
cases mentioned above the author then in the 
next chapters tries to explain how international 
work by using rational choice theory.
Before moving to the next chapter, the 
author explains the methodology and scope 
of his book. The book adopts rational choice 
assumptions as methodology. By doing so, 
states are assumed to be rational, self-interest, 
and able to identify and pursue their interests. 
States do not concern themselves with the 
welfare of other states but instead seek to 
maximize their own gain or payoff. States also 
are unaffected by legitimacy of rule of law, past 
consent to a rule or decision maker influence. 
Because it starts with a set of assumptions, 
rather than observation about state behavior, 
the analysis using in this book is primarily a 
theoretical approach only although there some 
examples that will be used as illustrations. This 
book related to compliance with international 
law and cooperation in international affair. 
The book focuses on international law and 
more specifically on the conventional source 
of international law such as treaties, customary 
international law and it also examines soft law 
such as resolution of the UN General Assembly 
and other international norms.
Second	 chapter of this book focuses 
on The Three Rs Compliance (reputation, 
reciprocity and retaliation) to explain rational 
choice theory. The main objectives of this 
chapter are to demonstrate how international 
legal obligation might influence state behavior 
and how this theory can be applied in the 
various areas and sources of international law. 
In this case, the author divides games in which 
state play into two categories (state relatively 
easy and difficult to cooperate), but the latter 
game that the theory is apply throughout of 
the book. Reputation is defined as judgments 
about an actor’s past behavior used to predict 
future behavior. In this sense the author 
confines reputation’s definition only in the 
Padjadjaran	Journal	of	International	Law
Volume 1, Number 1, January 2017
114
context of state’s reputation for compliance 
with international law rather than other types 
of reputation. If states breach international 
law, they will suffer reputational sanction. 
When states face two option (to comply or 
violate) other state will assess this decision. If 
a state tends to comply, it will be awarded as 
a good reputation state. Conversely, if a state 
tends to violate its international obligation, it 
will have a bad reputation for compliance. Like 
reputation, Reciprocity will often be taken by 
a state in response of a violation by withdraw 
their own compliance with international 
agreement because once violation takes place 
the agreement ceases to serve their interest. 
In bilateral context, reciprocity can be used as 
powerful compliance-enhancing tool (remedy). 
Retaliation, in contrast describes actions that 
are costly to retaliating state and intended to 
punish the violating party. Retaliatory action 
might include such as economic, diplomatic or 
even military sanction.
In	 multilateral	 context, the author 
concluded that although reciprocity is unlikely 
to proof an effective tool to sustain compliance, 
sometimes reciprocity is regarded as a useful 
tool to encourage compliance. This case can be 
seen in the WTO system, for example when WTO 
adjudicatory bodies concluded that European 
Community had violated their obligation 
with respect to importation of beef artificial 
growth hormones, they granted United States 
and Canada the right to suspend certain trade 
obligation they had toward Europe. In contrast 
with reciprocity, retaliation can often serves as 
enforcement device. For example, in the ICCPR, 
if Russia is tempted to violate its commitment, 
Russia will suffer retaliatory sanction, such as 
ban of export from other states.
In the third chapter, this book focuses on 
the nature of reputation as part of rational choice 
theory in comprehensive manner. This chapter 
begins by asking how reputation is acquired 
and lost. Before explaining this question, the 
author defines reputation as judgments about 
an actor’s past behavior used to predict future 
behavior. But in the context of international 
law, reputation is related to state’s behavior as 
main actor/subject or more precisely related 
to state’s reputation for compliance with 
international law. There are some reasons why 
state complied with international law such as 
the domestic politics in the state and the value 
of the future opportunities to cooperate. The 
nature of reputation itself can be seen when 
there is a large number of interactions among 
states. When a state has breached an obligation, 
the state will suffer a reputational loss and so 
the state’s partner no longer has reason to 
believe promises of future cooperation. In this 
case, reputation may work better in multilateral 
setting than bilateral ones because reputational 
consequences of a violation will be more severe 
in multilateral context. 
Returning to the main question on how 
reputation is gained and lost, the value of 
reputation will not be the same for every state 
or in every issue area. In some circumstances 
the matter of reputation is not easy to be 
determined. But, the key point here is when 
reputation is gained and more valuable, States 
therefore be more willing to comply with an 
international legal commitment. Principally, 
every observing states has different way to 
measure other state’s reputation, for example 
United State may have different reputation in 
Canada, Argentina, Russia and Syiria. 
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Another question raised in this chapter 
is how reputation can be gauged (good or 
bad reputation)?. The simple answer is if 
a state chooses to comply, it receives total 
payoff that consist of the non-reputational 
plus the reputational payoff. If on the other 
hand, the state violates legal rules it will lost 
its reputations. In deciding how to act, the 
state compares the total payoff in the event 
of violation to what it would receive should 
it comply. Violation is only tempting to the 
state if the non-reputational from violation is 
larger than the non-reputational payoff from 
compliance. 
In the fourth	 chapter, this book tries to 
develop rational choice theory into international 
agreements, or in other word this chapter 
pays more attention on theoretical approach 
than the empirical one. By doing so, the 
author analyzes some aspects of international 
agreements. For instance, the problem of 
enforcement of treaties by considering not 
only dispute resolution and enforcement tool 
but also the monitoring mechanism and other 
tools to encourage compliance. The author 
in this chapter doesn’t circumscribes what 
kind of agreement they will use. It can be 
bilateral or multilateral treaties, binding and 
less formal treaties or soft law. The key point 
that the author remarks here is although states 
have many objectives when they make an 
agreement, rational states are able to assess 
the value of any particular agreement, and 
select the available agreement maximizing that 
payoff. All the choices states make when they 
negotiate an agreement are part of the effort to 
get the greatest possible benefits.
Related to soft law, the author explains 
that although soft law contains less commitment 
than treaties, sometimes states are going to 
switch theirs commitment by entering into soft 
law agreements when substantive and formal 
provisions of treaties appears more stringent 
and consequently it increases the cost of state 
behavior. The author emphasizes that soft law 
is not and should not be considered something 
apart from other form of international law. It 
should instead be recognized as one option. 
Another important feature in this chapter 
discusses more specific provision on the law of 
treaty “that so-called reservation” (section 2, 
article 19-23 VCLT 1969). Like any other author 
focusing on the law of treaty, the author also 
explain some aspect of reservation such as 
permitting and prohibition reservation and the 
nature of reservation that differs from escape 
and exit clause.
 In the	fifth	chapter, the author explores in 
comprehensive manner and dive much deeper 
into the topic of CIL (customary international 
law) by raising the question how the theory 
of compliance is able to make sense of CIL?. 
Although treaties and soft law are relatively 
easy to be applied in the theory of compliance 
through exchange of promises, pledge of 
reputational capital, establish reciprocal 
commitment and identify in which retaliatory 
action may be taken, CIL also has these rational 
choice force to protect their reputation, to treat 
reciprocal non-compliance and to retaliate 
other states. As part of one important source 
of international law, in this chapter the author 
gives clear definition of CIL both as traditional 
source of international law and as the basis for 
obligation undergirding the entire legal system. 
The former definition is strictly doctrinal by 
using two part of doctrinal test providing by 
article 38 of The Statue of the ICJ which defines 
CIL as “international custom, as evidence of 
a general practice accepted of law”. The first 
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element is “general practice”, then this term 
is classified by Mochtar Kusumaadmadja (The 
Father of International Law from Indonesia) as 
“Formal Source”. The Second element is “Opinio 
Juris (legal obligation)” or Mochtar called it as 
“Psychological Source”. Furthermore the author 
also restates that although treaties have taken 
over some areas of law that were formerly 
governed exclusively by custom, CIL continues 
to play a role in such critical area of law as state 
responsibility, state immunity, jurisdiction, 
foreign direct investment, and human right. 
The later defines CIL as the rule that must be 
obeyed such as the rule of treaties, one of the 
most famous example of CIL in this definition is 
“Pacta Sunt Servenda”.
In the sixth	chapter,  the author reveals the 
transformation development of international 
law by stating that “international law is 
undergoing a transformation from the discipline 
focused on practice and doctrine into theory 
and social science methodology”. One of the 
theory in question is what the author offered 
in this book, “The Rational Choice Theory” 
relying on three ways (Reputation, Reciprocal 
and Retaliation/The Three Rs) a violation can 
generate costs for a state. Each of the Three 
Rs can increase the cost of violation and, 
therefore promote cooperation. There are at 
least five conclusions containing in this chapter. 
First, Reciprocal on-compliance will raise if the 
violating state is unable to credibly promise 
compliance in the future. Second, A rational state 
will not use retaliation as a remedy unless doing 
so helps it to develop reputational for punishing 
violators or helps it end an ongoing violation. 
Third, there are some challenges in applying 
non-compliance reciprocity as a remedy in 
multilateral agreement such as in human rights 
and environmental agreements because it will 
often fail to promote coordination. Conversely, 
in applying retaliation as a remedy will often 
be more effective at promoting cooperation. 
It can be seen both in UN Charter and NATO, 
Article 25 UN Charter states that “each member 
states will accept and carry the decision of The 
Security Council” and more obviously can be 
observed in the article 5 NATO stating that “each 
members agrees to assist the party or parties so 
attack by taking forthwith an action that deems 
necessarily (individually or collective) including 
the use armed force to restore and maintain 
the security of North Atlantic area. In contrasts 
to reciprocity and retaliation, reputation can 
work better in multilateral agreement because 
compliance with international law improves 
a state’s reputation. Fourth, All agreement, 
whether treaties or not affect state behavior 
through the same mechanism but they have 
different spectrum in hierarchy of international 
law rules with the treaty is most likely to affect 
state behavior followed by soft law, customary 
international law and norms respectively. In 
addition, the author also states that relative to 
other norms, customary international law binds 
a state thoroughly although treaty represents 
the strongest form of international legal 
commitment. 
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